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Abstract
Shifting from a government-controlled system of motor insurance regulation to a market
based system has caused unexpected outcomes in Italy. Although there is more
competition since deregulation occurred twelve years ago, the government has had mixed
results attempting to continue to control the market. This paper will examine how pricing
deregulation on the European Union level has caused significant changes in the Italian
market. Furthermore, it will seek to develop a national solution for regulation of auto
insurance pricing within the United States using Italian experience. Regulation in the
insurance industry in the United States has been a subject of debate for quite some time,
and although there has been consensus among researchers on the need to change current
regulations, agreement on changes to make has not been quite as simple. The
recommendation of this study is to implement a system of federal supervision in pricing
regulation, while allowing states to conduct day-to-day oversight.

The Pricing Effects of European Union Insurance
Liberalization on Italian Motor Insurance
Introduction
Regulation ofthe insurance industry has historically been a highly regulated area in the
United States. When the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in 1945, the regulation of
insurance, including auto, was determined to be in the public interest of the states
(Cummins,2002). Consequently, a variety of rate regulations has developed in different
states. Although there has been consensus among researchers on the need to change
current insurance regulation, agreement on changes to make has not been quite as simple.
There have been several proposals, which have not passed, in the past few years about
how to modernize the industry as a whole to achieve more efficient, market-based
regulation of insurance. For example, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC), has been working towards convincing state insurance
commissioners to adopt "a common set of standards for a uniform market regulatory
oversight program that will include all states" (NAIC, 2003). Another proposal is by the
National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) promoting a use and file system l .
While, such systems do promote change, they do not address the entire regulatory
problem.
The US auto insurance industry in its current state is a problem for both the inslrrance
companies participating in the market and consumers who are legally obligated to
purchase an auto insurance policy. Because insurers face dramatically varying
regulations by state, costs are increased. A recent regulatory efficiency study about US
insurance by Grace and Klein (1999) concludes that operating efficiencies can be gained
by "eliminating non-essential market regulations and standardizing those regulations that
are retained." Accordingly, by allowing insurers to use one rate structure instead of
developing rates for all states, the creation a more efficient regulatory system is possible.
A similar situation occurred just over a decade ago in the European Union (EU).
However, while Cooper and Dorfman (2004) have written a plan for regulatory reform in
the US using details from the EU, research trying to apply results from EU insurance
liberalization to the US, is limited. Similar to Cooper and Dorfman (2004), this paper
will seek to use regulations of the EU to provide suggestions for reform in the us.
However, the focus will be on outlining a system of pricing regulation for the us that
provides consumer protection by promoting competition and increasing access to
insurance products2 • Moreover, specifically this paper will look at the effect the EU third
non-life directive had on Italian regulations for motor insurance pricing.
The organization of this paper is in the following manner: The second section will give a
history of Italian Motor Insurance. The third will illustrate the changes that have occurred
1 A system of regulation where an insurer can use rates for a period of time before being required to file
them with the state.

Increasing access to insurance products refers to creating a wider range of prices for motor insurance
products. Such a goal would be accomplished by going from a fixed price system to one in which
companies set their own separate rates.

2

in Italy because ofthe implementation of the EU third non-life directive. The fourth will
use experiences learned from Italy to apply to the US. Finally, section five proves
concluding comments.

Italian Motor Insurance History
Motor insurance3 has been and continues to be a large part of the insurance market in
Italy. As of2005, the Italian National Association of Insurance Companies (ANIA)
reported that motor insurance accounted for approximately 51 % of non-life4 premiums
collected. Motor insurance has been compulsory in Italy since December of 1969. Since
that time, there have also been strict regulations on tariffs, or premiums, that insurers
charge. Until 1994, the rates were set by the Italian Inter-ministerial Prices Committee
(CIP) based on recommendations from a commission of experts (Filippi Committee). To
determine these rates, the Filippi Committee met annually to set a range of possible rates
a company could charge for the next year. This range of rates used a set pure premium
and a range of possible loadings. In addition, three variables helped to personalize an
individual's rate: accident history, province of residence, and car power (Luperto and
Porrini, 2005) s. Accordingly, there was a small, if any, pricing differentiation among
inslrrers.
A number of issues have historically plagued the Italian motor insurance market. In its
review of the Italian insurance industry in 2005, ANIA reports that prior to 1994, Italian
motor insurance premiums did not respond to market conditions, as measured by the rate
of inflation. A comparison of rate increases against inflation is shown in Table 1.
Additionally, industry-wide combined ratios6 are examined to determine the adequacy of
rates. Starting in 1984, the growth of rates started to exceed the rate of inflation.
Although rates were increasing, the industry-wide combined ratio was increasing to over
110 percent. As indicated by an increasing combined ratio, this meant that rates were
becoming inadequate. By the end of the 1980's, a number of companies went bankrupt.
The bankruptcies caused the rates to rise faster than inflation in the early 1990's, but
adequacy was still not achieved (ANIA, 2005).

3

In Europe, vehicles are insured with motor insurance rather than with auto insurance, as in the us.

Non-life insurance refers to property/casualty insurance in the US and includes both auto and homeowners
insurance

4

The inclusion of accident history was by using a Bonus-Malus system. This system rewards and penalizes
drivers in the form of increased or reduced premiums based upon past accidents. Prior to 1991, the Bonus
Malus system in place had thirteen possible levels with a maximum of a 30% bonus and a maximum of a
100% malus. In 1991, a new system with eighteen classes was introduced. The maximum discount was
50%, while the maximum surcharge was 100% (Lemaire and Hongmin, 1994). The new system was not the
result of deregulation; rather it occurred near the same time. Thus, the specific details need not be
addressed in this paper. However, what is of importance is that the bonus or malus is included in the
premium following other calculations and is the same for all insurers. For additional reading on Bonus
Malus systems, see Lemaire (1995). Car power refers to the power of an engine, or horsepower.

S

6 The combined ratio is the sum of the loss ratio and the expense ratio. A ratio of less than 100 percent
means that a company earned a profit on insurance operations.

As noted, prior to rate deregulation in 1994, premiums were increasing. To determine
these increasing costs, frequency and severity are multiplied together. Table 2 shows the
history of frequency and severity of claims in Italian motor insurance. Before 1994, two
trends are of importance in the table. First, the frequency of claims was falling below
historical levels. However, it was still above levels in marketplaces throughout the EU.
Additionally, claims were costing more. Because frequency and severity are multiplied
together to determine the basis for the premium, an overall increase in rates resulted.
However, because of heavily regulated rates, premium increases did not follow higher
costs proportionately. Accordingly, the Italian market was struggling at the time of
implementation of the third ED non-life insurance directive.

The Third European Union Non-Life Insurance Directive
The third non-life directive introduced the ED to a single insurance market in 1994. In
planning the supranational reforms, the goals of the directive were to create a single
insurance marketplace in the ED, promote competition, and increase the supply of
insurance products. 7 Because of becoming a single marketplace, companies were able to
operate in all member countries after receiving a license in only one. In addition, rating
regulation changed how rates were determined in ED member countries. Throughotlt the
entire ED, great changes were being made to allow for a unified marketplace. These
changes were quite evident in Italy, as the Italian motor insurance industry changed
dramatically in and after 1994. After deregulation, companies in Italy were responsible
for setting their own rates. In effect, what the liberalization has done to Italy is free it to
react to market forces, causing rates to reflect loss experience. Although many changes
resulted from the directive, the focus here will be on the effect of pricing regulation on
competition and supply.
Prior to the directive, ED members could set pricing regulations by country, as there was
no supranational control. As shown in Italy, this could result in the government
controlling rates. However, after the directive, the type of allowable regulation was much
more limited. COllntries could no longer use prior approval rating. According to Council
Directive 92/49/EEC (1992), as "Member States shall not, however, adopt provisions
requiring the prior approval or systematic notification of...scales of premiums...which an
undertaking intends to use with policyholders." In addition, the directive states that,
"Member States may not retain or introduce prior notification or approval of proposed
increases in premium rates except as part of general price-control systems."

7 There have been a total of five directives non-life directives by the ED. Although the third directive is the
directive dealing with pricing regulation, the others are important in creating a single ED marketplace. The
fIrst directive was adopted in 1973 and gave insurers the right to establish subsidiaries, branch offices, and
agencies in each member country. However, insurers were required to be licensed in each country. The
second directive, adopted in 1990 allowed insurers to do business in other member countries without having
started a branch in each country (Cummins and RUbio-Misas, 2001). The fourth directive was introduced in
2003. It introduced procedures for out of country accidents and created a national registration system for
vehicles and the amount of liability coverage on vehicles (ANIA, 2004). The fifth directive increases
minimum liability amounts, refined a procedure for out of country claims, and ensures that countries cannot
limit compensation caused by uninsured vehicles (ANIA, 2005).

While the directive does not entirely prohibit a price control system, it does make such a
system difficult to implement or become legal. Court opinions from case C-59/01 (2003)
have determined that a general price control system must be an economy wide price
control system. Thus, the controls must not solely affect one sector, such as third-party
liability motor insurance. Accordingly, it is not permissible to use a prior approval
system that does not also control prices throughout an economy. The result of this
regulation had a great effect on Italian motor insurance, as it allowed companies to
determine their own rates.
Furthermore, it increased flexibility in rating by allowing for additional variables. Before
the directive, only three variables were available for use in rating, as they were set by the
CIP. The resulting freedoms caused the use ofnlany new variables, allowing for more
flexibility and hence competition. An example of the variables used, as of 1996, is
shown in Table 3. When considering the variables in the table, it is important to note
companies mayor may not use all listed variables, thus it should be considered a guide
and not a rule. Additionally, the comparison to the US illustrates a regulatory philosophy
as to which variables are allowable by regulators in the EU and us. However, such a
topic is beyond the scope of this papers.
Moreover, the directive effectively increased the supply ofmotor insurance products to
the Italian marketplace. Although, the number of companies present in the insurance
marketplace traditionally measures supply, such a measure cannot be considered adequate
in this situation given the uniform nature of previous tariffs. Accordingly, there would
have been no benefit for a consumer to attempt to switch insurers to receive a different
rate. However, now that the supply has increased as insurers now set their own rates,
consumers are often able to find a less expensive price for the same insurance. ANIA
(2005) reports that on average, when seeking the lowest price, a consumer can find a
reduction of about ten percent. Consequently, the directive has increased the supply of
motor insurance products in Italy.
However, the insurance market in Italy was not entirely positive after the implementation
of the third directive. The beliefwas that the directive would result in a greater stability
of premiums. However, the market was not in a good condition before the directive, thus
leading to unexpected results. Instead of causing tariffs to beconle more stable, they have
risen dramatically, as shown in Table 1. In fact, the average premitun increase from 1980
to 1994 was just over four euros a year. In the period from 1994 to 2004 that increase has
been about eleven euros per year. However, ANIA (2005) illustrates that these rate
increases are not the direct result of the third directive. The increases are primarily from
property damage and an increase in the cost of the cost of vehicle repairs. In fact, from
1996 to 2004, there has been an average increase in the cost of property damage per claim
of 70%. This compares to a 20% overall increase in prices. Similarly, Turchetti and
Daraio (2004) report that the increasing premiums are the result of combination of several
factors: an increase in the number ofvehicles, higher powered cars, higher insured value,
increase in the average cost of compensations for damage, the rise in the cost of repairs,
frequency of cervical spine lesions, and the frequency of fraud.
S For additional reading about the regulation of pricing variables, see Luperto and Porrini (2005) or
Buzzacchi and Valletti (2002).

Because the determination of pure premium is not solely by the average cost of claims, it
is also necessary to consider claim frequency, which has declined. Similarly, this should
not be attributed to the implementation of the third directive. Rather, ANIA (2004, 2005)
reports that vehicles are safer, cars are driven less, more fraud checks are occurring, less
minor damage is being reported, and a driving record reflecting traffic violations.
To create an improved marketplace, the Italian government attempted two courses of
action, both occurring in 2000: antitrust regulation and a price freeze. As reported by
ANIA (2001), the Italian motor insurance market had antitrust violations by 39 ofthe 81
companies in the motor insurance market. It was found that these 39 companies were
exchanging data and therefore creating similar rates. This cooperation by companies was
found to have contributed to the significant price increases9 • Accordingly, prices were not
free to competition, causing a smaller supply of products.
Antitrust regulation was not the only way that the government attempted to retain control
over escalating premiums. In response to increasing prices, the government took action
to freeze tariffs in 2000, stating, "that insurance companies shall not apply any rate
increase to policyholders that have not been the cause of claims during the last period of
observation as regards third party motor liability policies renewed within one year from
29 March 2000..." (ANIA, 2000) This effectively prevented any further price increases.
However, because the action violated the third directive, ANIA took the issue to the
European Court of Justice.
The Court of Justice concluded that the price freeze was in violation of European
regulations. Specifically, that the regulations were designed so that rates were to be
freely established (ANIA, 2003). Consequently, the principles of the third directive
caused the tariff freeze to be overturned. Accordingly, the third directive did in fact
promote competition, and did not allow the government to restrict the competition.

US Regulatory Consequences
Consequently, using the stated goals of providing consumer protection by promoting
competition and increasing access insurance products, a model using regulations from the
EU and Italy will be developed. To develop this model, it is first necessary to understand
the condition of auto insurance rate regulation in the US. There is a great variability in
regulations in the US because each state, instead of federal government, has been
regulating the commerce of insurance. In Illinois, insurance companies are free to set
their own rates, known as competitive rating, although they may be required to provide
supporting documents to justify their rates. This is the most liberal form of all rating laws
in the U.S. On the other extreme is the prior approval system of New Jersey until 2005.
The strict regulatory system caused a number of insurers to refrain from conducting
business in the state.

For additional information regarding the price increases and possible solutions for the price increases, see
Buzzacchi (2001). This paper is in Italian.

9

These extremes show that regulation is by no means similar. It is for this reason, that a
system of rate regulation making all states required to use the exact same regulations
would not be a possible solution, at least politically. Adopting a system similar to the one
that the European Union imposed does not mean that all states must act in the same
manner. Instead, it means a national system customized by each state. An example ofthe
use of variables to customize rates by country in the EU is included as part ofTable 3.
Although Italy, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom are all part of
the EU, national regulations cause different variables to be used depending on the
country.
Although the Italian market did not produce results as expected, it has provided a number
of important lessons that should be applied to the US. First and most important is that the
indications ofthe market should not be ignored. As was the case in Italy, regulators
imposed rates that caused the combined ratio to increase. The result was first
insolvencies, and second, the use of large rates increases which were needed to adjust the
tariffs to adequate levels. Although, it took the market eight years to reach the point
where the combined ratio was less than 100%, rate increases in the past two years have
been under 5% (ANIA, 2005). Accordingly, the implementation of this lesson for pricing
is through allowing companies to set rates as they see fit. Further analysis of this topic
would require examining solvency regulation lO, but it is beyond the scope of this paper
and should be the subject of future study.
As demonstrated by the ruling in case C-59/01, regarding Council Directive 92/49/EEC,
the goal is to provide ''the widest possible range of insurance products in the Community
so that he can choose that which is best suited to his needs" (2003). Applied to the US, a
similar conclusion should be drawn. More precisely, a national regulatory system that
ensures pricing regulation allowing insurers to set their own rates is most suitable. This
system, as in the EU, should act in a way that encourages responses to the market, rather
than a system designed to control pricing systems. However, such a system that
absolutely prohibits prior pricing controls would be difficult to pass politically.
Therefore, the provision of "general price control systems" should be added. By
requiring this provision, the auto insurance industry would not be singled out by
regulators. Instead, many industries would have to be included within the controls.
Creating a system that encourages states to open the auto insurance marketplace to the
free market will cause two events to happen: greater competition to exist among states
and a greater quantity of products to be offered. These two points are illustrated from the
recent example of market deregulation in South Carolina. Prior to deregulation in South
Carolina, regulations limited insurers in their use of accident history, territories, and
mandated a 20% safe driver discount. In addition, there were strict enforcements of price

10 The role of solvency regulation is to make sure insurers have enough money to pay claims, thus
preventing insolvency. Current regulations require solvency regulation to be overseen by the member
country in which the head office is located. There is an overall guideline, and each country can set control
solvency how it sees fit. Accordingly, each country can determine categories for investments, valuation of
assets, and calculation of technical reserves (The Council of European Communities, 1973). For additional
reading about ED insurance solvency, see CEA (2006).

ceilings. These combinations led to a large residual market ll where customers in the
normal insurance market were heavily subsidizing the residual market. Initial reports by
Cummins (2002) tell ofthe positive results of deregulation. First, a substantial reduction
of the residual market, from 42% in 1992 to 28% and falling in 1998, has occurred.
Additionally, an increase in the number of companies participating in the market
occurred. In 1999, the year of deregulation the number of companies participating in the
South Carolina market increased from 61 to 104. Therefore, deregulation of pricing
regulations has been shown to provide both increased competition and an increase in
products offered in Italy as well as South Carolina.
Conclusion

The implementation of the third EU non-life directive has greatly changed the Italian
motor insurance market. By creating more competition and a greater supply of products,
the directive has helped to deregulate the marketplace. The deregulation, however, did
not transfer all control from the Italian government, as antitrust solutions were
successfully applied in 2000.
This model of motor insurance between the EU and Italy, should act as a guide for a US
state and federal auto insurance system. Because research supports a uniform insurance
regulatory structure, a federal governing body should be established. The federal body
would set national regulations that must be used by states. Each state would then have
the power to control operations within it, such as acceptable variables or antitrust
violations. Accordingly, a federal oversight group should be created in order to oversee
the regulation of the pricing of auto insurance in the United States.

11 A residual market occurs when insures do not voluntarily insure consumers and are instead required to
insure these individuals, who are considered higher risks.
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Table 1
Rate Increases in Italy (1984-2004)
Inflation (Base 1984)
Premium (Base 1984)
Year
100.0
100.0
1984
1985
106.9
108.3
1986
114.6
115.7
1987
119.7
121.4
1988
124.6
125.4
1989
134.2
133.3
1990
147.4
141.3
150.8
1991
165.2
1992
179.9
159.8
1993
166.8
184.2
1994
189.6
173.6
1995
199.8
183.4
191.1
1996
210.1
1997
226.8
195.7
200.7
1998
239.6
1999
264.2
207.7
2000
276.5
215.8
2001
286.7
224.0
2002
302.9
233.7
2003
312.3
242.1
2004
313.7
247.1
Source: Associazione Nazionale fra Ie Imprese Assicuratrici (2005)

Table 2
Claims Frequency and Average Claims Cost in Italian Motor Insurance 1980-2004
Year

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

Claims Frequency

15.21%
14.33%
13.84%
13.40%
13.42%
13.46%
13.61%
14.04%
14.00%
14.69%
14.61%
14.02%
13.42%
11.83%
11.19%
11.71%
11.63%
11.54%
10.95%
11.05%
10.95%
9.55%
8.78%
8.63%
8.45%

Average Claims Cost1 2

1227
1272
1244
1359
1395
1432
1487
1519
1545
1505
1541
1634
1748
1947
2025
2153
2256
2395
2635
2815
3105
3427
3707
3889
3965

Source: Based on Associazione Nazionale fra Ie Imprese Assicuratrici (2005) and US
Department of Labor (2005) data

12

Real cost in 2004 euros

Table 3
Rating Variables in EU Member Countries and selected US states (1996 data)
N
Experience
Rating
Gender
Age
Place of
Residence
Occupation
Marital Status
Years of
Driving
License
Coverage of
Specified
Driver
Parking
Car Type
Car Age
Mileage for
year
Car Utilization
Car Power
Safety Device
Ownership of
more than
one car

Italy

CA

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

PA

p.

Belgium

Canada

France

Germany

Spain

UK

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X

TX

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

J

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X

* Prohibited
Source: Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (2003)

X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

